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NUCLEAR POWER AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS· 
By Robert Drinan, S.J. ** 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the most critical long-term issues to come before the Na-
tion's legislature will be the inevitable congressional decision on the 
future of nuclear power in America-a decision that must be made 
within the next few years and that should be based on considered 
and informed judgment, rather than response to publicity, pressure 
or panic. At the moment, there is a growing debate within Congress 
over the risks and benefits of nuclear power, a debate sustained 
more by rhetoric and assertion than by reliable, unbiased, valid 
information and analysis. This article addresses the problem of im-
proving the quality of the ultimate decision, together with a brief 
discussion of the status of this debate. A proposal is offered that 
Congress better prepare itself by directing its Office of Science and 
Technology to make a five-year, comprehensive study of all the 
industrial activities relating to nuclear power to fully reveal the 
associated safety and environmental hazards. 
In the last three and a half decades, a time barely long enough 
for an individual to reach middle age, the United States has wit-
nessed the emergence of an Atomic Age that has transformed our 
international defense and now seems to offer a quick "technological 
fix" to close the gap between domestic use and supply of fuels and 
energy.! Nuclear proponents anticipate many social, economic and 
environmental benefits from nuclear power. The President and his 
administration, the nuclear industry, and many scientists and engi-
neers still expect nuclear power to become a major source of energy 
for the Nation by the year 2000,2 and to offer an ideal source of clean 
and inexpensive electricity. Nuclear pessimists, while recognizing 
some benefits, believe that the several drawbacks of nuclear power 
have been insufficiently considered, and that when they are consid-
ered, the risks and dangers so far overbalance benefits as to warrant 
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shutting down existing nuclear powerplants and barring further 
use of uranium as a fuel. Thus, in this 36th year of the Atomic 
Age,3 many Americans who think about nuclear power are deeply 
divided over the desirability and safety of nuclear powerplants as 
an answer to our energy needs. 
Nuclear power today, although an economic reality, still contrib-
utes less electric power than do the Nation's hydroelectric plants. 
As of March 31, 1975, some 53 nuclear powerplants, with a com-
bined electrical generating capacity of 36 gigawatts,4 are licensed to 
operate; 76 plants representing some 121 gigawatts are in early 
stages of planning and authorization, for a total of 235 nuclear pow-
erplants, representing a generating capacity of some 234 gigawatts.s 
By comparison, the total electrical generating capacity of the 
United States in 1973 was some 436 gigawatts. 
President Ford in his State of the Union Message6 announced he 
would propose measures to energize our nuclear power program and 
submit legislation to expedite the licensing and rapid selection of 
sites for nuclear powerplants. His energy plan contemplates that 
within the next ten years there will be 200 major nuclear power-
plants in operation.7 
I. THE NUCLEAR DEBATE 
The election of many new persons to Congress last year has in-
creased the number of Members concerned with the debate over the 
future of nuclear power. As this debate intensifies, signs can be 
detected of an unhealthy polarization of attitudes between those 
who favor nuclear power and those who oppose it. Members of Con-
gress also are confused by the great proliferation of scientific papers 
and well-reasoned statements pro and con on this issue.s 
The problem for Congress is the classic one of what to do when 
equally eminent authorities hold opposing views. The solution must 
lie in finding new ways for Congress to obtain impartial, informed, 
competent analyses and assessments that can winnow out the truth 
from supposition and assertion, and discard the exaggerations of 
special interests, whether pro or con. The energy and the radiologi-
cal future of the Nation are issues too important to be decided 
simply by a heads-or-tails choice between opposing briefs which by 
their nature emphasize one side and ignore or minimize the other.9 
It is useful to examine briefly the main issue of the Congressional 
debate. The underlying concern is the potential risk from commer-
cial nuclear power. Many scientists, engineers, members of the pub-
lic and even past employees of the former Atomic Energy Commis-
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sion have warned of the potential dangers from expanding commer-
cial nuclear power. There are risks which should be carefully scruti-
nized and debated before permitting nuclear powerplants to prolif-
erate across the American landscape. The most troublesome risks 
include the possible catastrophic accidental release of radioactive 
wastes; the reliability of the emergency core cooling system (ECCS), 
designed to prevent a core melt accident; the possible theft of nu-
clear materials and sabotage offacilities; the inadequately insulated 
disposal of highly radioactive powerplant wastes; the long-term ef-
fects of routine emission of small amounts of radioactive materials 
from nuclear facilities; and the possible inferior operating efficiency 
of nuclear powerplants. These risks have been the focal points for 
much of the controversy over nuclear power. 
A. The probability of a catastrophic release. 
A nuclear powerplant contains quantities of radioactive materials 
which far exceed the amounts that are capable of causing deadly 
exposures, and also large quantities of plutonium, a material which 
is toxic and thought by some to be a cancer-producing agent in 
human beings. The worst conceivable nuclear accident is one that 
would cause the release of much of these intensely dangerous mate-
rials into the environment. Should such a release occur during 
certain weather conditions, many people would be exposed to inju-
rious or deadly amounts of radiation with large urban or agricultural 
areas made uninhabitable for a long time. 
At issue is the probability of such an accident and the effect of 
various engineering measures on such a probability. The Congress 
last year eagerly awaited the arrival of an extensive report by Profes-
sor Norman Rasmussen of the Massachusetts Institute of Technol-
ogy on probabilities of major nuclear accidents. to The Rasmussen 
report was published in draft in August 1974. 11 While the report gave 
nuclear power a clean bill of health,12 it has come under heavy fire 
from those who question both its assumptions and conclusions. In 
view of the debate over the merits of the Rasmussen report and the 
fact that it was financed with $3 million from the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC), which had a vested interest in a favorable re-
port, many Members of Congress have had difficulty in accepting 
its conclusions as disinterested and impartialY 
Congress must also consider another recent report on nuclear 
safety. Published by the American Physical Society14 and produced 
by a study group headed by Professor Harold W. Lewis of the Uni-
versity of California, Santa Barbara, the report examined the issue 
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of safety in the operation of the type of nuclear power reactors most 
widely used in the United States,15 the national research and devel-
opment program for establishing and enhancing safety, and the 
consequences of nuclear accidents for public health and welfare. 
Unlike the Rasmussen report, the Lewis report was not funded by 
the AEC. Rather, the neutral National Science Foundation pro-
vided much of the needed support. The Lewis report, while recog-
nizing the excellent safety record of light-water reactors to date, sees 
the need for a continuing major effort to improve light-water reactor 
safety as well as to understand and mitigate the consequences of 
possible accidents. 
According to the Lewis report, while a complete quantitative as-
sessment of all the important aspects of reactor safety and behavior 
under unusual circumstances cannot now be made, a much better 
quantitative evaluation and consequent improvements of the safety 
situation can be achieved over the next decade if certain aspects of 
safety research are substantially improved and the results of that 
research put to use.18 
The Lewis report, while not ringing an alarm of immediate dan-
ger, makes it clear that the consequences of a major accidental 
release can be fearsome indeed17 and that the present technology of 
nuclear powerplants needs considerable improvement to further 
reduce the probabilities of such a release. Congress must read these 
recommendations for additional safety research and analysis as a 
warning that without this effort, and, even more importantly, with-
out application of the results from additional research and develop-
ment, the likelihood of major accidents will be unacceptably high 
if nuclear plants proliferate as now anticipated. 
Nuclear industry has maintained thus far a commendable safety 
record, as noted in both the Rasmussen and Lewis reports. Yet this 
limited experience and computer or paper and pencil analyses of the 
remote possibility of nuclear accidents are by no means conclusive. 
Both the Rasmussen and Lewis reports indicate that the chances of 
a disastrous nuclear accident occurring, while extremely slight, are 
not zero. The consequences of such an accident are potentially cata-
strophic; the stakes of public health and safety become so high that 
we cannot accept assurances at face value. Both reports clearly 
indicate that there are gaps in the information needed to estimate 
valid probabilities for major accidents .. These gaps must be filled 
before a decision is made on the future of nuclear energy. Bland 
assurances are not a satisfactory basis for legislative action. 
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B. Design uncertainties: the problem of the ECCS. 
One of the most dangerous situations for a nuclear power reactor 
is the loss of cooling water flow. Without cooling, there is a strong 
probability that the nuclear core will melt, releasing within the 
reactor enormous quantities of radioactive fission products. Fur-
thermore, it is conceivable that the extremely hot, molten core could 
melt its way through the bottom of the reactor, through other pro-
tective barriers, and into the earth beneath, whence radioactive 
gases and other radioactive wastes could escape into the environ-
ment. At the insistence of Federal regulatory requirements, the de-
sign of nuclear power reactors has emphasized incorporation of 
emergency core cooling systems (ECCS). In essence, an ECCS is 
intended to be a nuclear "emergency brake" to cool the reactor if 
normal cooling is lost, until the radioactivity of the core has dimin-
ished enough to make melting unlikely. On its face, the regulatory 
requirement for emergency core cooling is eminently sensible. But 
the real safety afforded to the public depends upon whether these 
systems will work as designed. There has never been a test of an 
emergency core cooling system in a large operating power reactor 
under emergency conditions. The AEC, and now the Nuclear Regu-
latory Commission (NRC), in approving the design of large nuclear 
powerplants, evaluate their ECCS by relying upon analysis by com-
puter models of what is supposed to happen. A presumably defini-
tive experimental demonstration, the so-called "loss-of-flow-test" 
(LOFT) initiated years ago by the AEC, after being repeatedly de-
layed and scaled down in purpose, has yet to start up even though 
large nuclear powerplants have been licensed for years on the pre-
sumption that their emergency cooling systems will indeed perform 
as designed. In such circumstances, two major categories of ques-
tions remain to be answered about this emergency system before 
Congress can conclude that such systems are adequate to keep the 
risk of catastrophic core melting within tolerable bounds. The first 
category involves the problem of devising accurate, complete and 
comprehensive analytical models for a geometrically complex sys-
tem that is undergoing transients involving changes of state and 
rapidly changing pressures and temperatures. The second category 
is concerned with the response of the parts of the system to the 
calculated transients. IS For both categories the dominant issue is the 
ability of computers to sufficiently simulate an extraordinarily com-
plex physical situation. 
As things now stand for the ECCS, some experimental informa-
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tion may be available within a year, since the long-delayed LOFT 
facility is scheduled for completion in fiscal year 1976 and some 
preliminary non-nuclear experiments are to be performed during 
this period. Experiments with a live nuclear core to test predictions 
of core and reactor responses following a loss-of-coolant accident are 
not scheduled before fiscal year 1977 .19 Thus, these important issues 
presently remain open. The doubts concerning the ability of ECCS 
systems to perform as designed in an emergency are a strong reason 
to question the wisdom of plans for rapid expansion of nuclear 
power.20 
c. Theft, sabotage and nuclear safeguards. 
The possibility of theft of nuclear materials for use by terrorists 
or other extremist or criminal groups as weapons of terror, and of 
sabotage of nuclear facilities to release dangerous radioactive mate-
rials is a further risk to public health and safety and to national 
security that must be considered in a decision on the future of 
nuclear energy. 21 Until critics of nuclear power recently began to call 
attention to safeguards and sabotage, these issues received little 
attention. The development of an effective system to safeguard nu-
clear materials and facilities, to a greater extent than with other 
nuclear safeguards, involves social and economic aspects rather 
than purely technical ones. Increased terrorist activity throughout 
the world and the measure of terror employed should dispel any 
assumption that terrorist groups will refrain from using nuclear de-
vices if they can obtain them. Dr. Theodore B. Taylor, a former 
designer of nuclear weapons and a long-term advocate of stronger 
safeguards for nuclear materials and facilities, warned Congress in 
1974 about two risks associated with nuclear technology: the possi-
bility of theft of nuclear materials that might be used by terrorists 
for blackmail or other destructive purposes; and the possibility of 
sabotage at nuclear facilities in ways that might seriously endanger 
the public.22 According to Taylor, nuclear weapons are relatively 
easy to make, assuming the required nuclear materials and equip-
ment are available. All of the information, non-nuclear materials 
and equipment required to design and build a variety of types of 
fission explosives are readily available throughout the world. Under 
the circumstances conceivable to Dr. Taylor, a few persons, perhaps 
even one working alone, possessing about 10 kilograms of plutonium 
or uranium-233 oxide or two dozen kilograms of highly enriched 
uranium oxide could, within several weeks, safely design and build 
a crude fission bomb that would be very likely to explode with a 
NUCLEAR ENERGY 601 
yield equivalent to at least 100 tons of high explosive, and that could 
be carried in an automobile. 23 
With this somber assessment in mind, one wonders about the 
laxity in guarding nuclear materials that was highlighted in a 1973 
report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) which declared that 
protection systems at two nuclear facilities were inadequate. 24 While 
the NRC and its predecessor, the AEC, have tightened up regula-
tions for protection of nuclear materials and facilities in private 
hands, it is by no means reassuring that at the time of the GAO 
investigation a determined thief could have made off with danger-
ous amounts of fissionable materials. 
The safeguard terrorist problem was brought out in 1974 when 
Senator Ribicoff obtained and published the Rosenbaum report, an 
internal report of the AEC that addressed the safeguards issue.25 
This special Safeguards Study advised the AEC's Director of Li-
censing that in recent years the factors which make safeguards a 
real, imminent and vital issue had changed rapidly for the worse: 
Terrorist groups have increased their professional skills, intelligence 
networks, finances, and levels of armaments throughout the world. In-
ternational terrorist organizations, particularly those of the Arabs, prob-
ably have the ability to infiltrate highly trained teams of 10 to 15 men 
into this country without detection. 26 
The Rosenbaum report saw two developments which necessitate 
a new and fundamental look at the problem. First is the widespread 
and increasing dissemination of precise and accurate instruction on 
the manufature of nuclear weapons. As a result, "larger and larger 
numbers of people with experience in processing special nuclear 
materials and with varying psychological attitudes are dispersed in 
the overall industrial community."27 Second is the recent upsurge 
of political kidnappings within the United States. These kidnap-
pings could lead to a rise of urban terrorist groups in the United 
States likely to have available to them the technical knowledge 
needed to build a nuclear weapon. The Rosenbaum group concluded 
that the seriousness of the problem demanded a clear commitment 
by the AEC to bring the risk to the public from theft down to the 
level of public risk associated with the operation of nuclear power-
plants.28 
The need for improved physical protection of nuclear materials 
and facilities appears again in the draft final declaration of the 
Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-
Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, which was issued in Geneva on 
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May 30, 1975. In this document, the participants, including the 
Soviet Union, expressed their belief that nuclear materials should 
be effectively protected at all times and urged action for the physi-
cal protection of nuclear material in use, storage and transit, with 
a view to insuring a uniform, minimum level of effective protection 
for such material. 
Such a recommendation gives further reason to fear that nuclear 
theft is not unthinkable and that grave consequences could result 
from sabotage or terrorist activities. Unfortunately, nuclear power-
plants and associated installations seem to present an ideal target 
for such activities.29 
D. The long-term segregation of nuclear wastes. 
The generation of nuclear power inevitably creates intensely radi-
oactive wastes. In principle, these wastes are separated from used 
nuclear fuels when the latter are processed to recover residual en-
riched uranium and by-product plutonium. These wastes are so 
radioactive that they must be kept out of the environment for centu-
ries. Indeed, society may have become party to a "Faustian bar-
gain"30 with nuclear technologists in which it expects to enjoy the 
benefits of nuclear power in exchange for a commitment to confine 
these wastes long after the last nuclear powerplant has been decom-
missioned and forgotten. At the moment there are no commercial 
arrangements to reprocess nuclear fuel or to store the wastes, nor is 
there presently a commercially feasible technology to transform 
them into forms less likely to escape into the environment.31 How-
ever, the experience to date with the storage of somewhat similar 
wastes from the manufacture of plutonium for nuclear weapons 
gives cause for concern.32 
Presently, some 90 million gallons of liquid, intensely radioactive 
wastes are stored at government-owned sites in about 200 storage 
tanks. Since the AEC has had the most experience with the han-
dling of these dangerous wastes, it would seem reasonable to expect 
the AEC's (and now the Energy Research and Development Admin-
istration's (ERDA» management of these wastes to provide an ex-
ample of thoroughness, reliability and care. Yet over the years sev-
eral failures have occurred in these storage tanks which have re-
sulted in leaks of highly radioactive liquids into the environment. 
At Hanford alone, over 423,500 gallons leaked from 16 tanks. The 
largest single leak occurred in mid-1973, when one tank leaked a 
total of 115,000 gallons.33 Until an economically and technically 
feasible way of storing these wastes has been demonstrated, the 
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nuclear power industry will have no way to dispose of them. This 
gap in the chain of supporting industrial capabilities for the nuclear 
industry must give many potential investors in nuclear powerplants 
cause for concern. And even when such technological measures be-
come available, there will remain the unanswered moral question of 
the right of this generation to saddle their descendents with the 
burden of caring for these dangerous wastes. 34 
E. Routine low level emissions. 
Nuclear powerplants are presently designed to discharge small 
amounts of radioactive materials into the air and water during rou-
tine operations. In principle, these residuals from waste treatment 
processes are so small that the additional benefit of zero discharge 
is not worth the additional capital and operating costs of the equip-
ment that would be required to prevent the discharge of a single 
radioactive atom.35 While the likely emissions from a single plant 
are probably genuinely low in level, it may be argued that there has 
been insufficient attention to the accumulation of these releases as 
more nuclear powerplants come into operation, particularly in as 
denseiy populated an area as New England. While the AEC since 
1947 has funded research into biological effects of radiation, even 
now, some 30 years later, there is only a good understanding of the 
effects of large exposures, but not of the effects of longterm ex-
posure to very low levels of radioactive materials. 
Almost three years ago, the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) published a major report of the National Academy of Sci-
ences on current scientific knowledge of health risks from ionizing 
radiation.36 
The Advisory Committee of the National Academy was chaired 
by Professor Comar of Cornell University,31 The Comar report was 
written in anticipation of the widespread increased use of atomic 
energy and to provide a basis to evaluate radiation protection from 
small exposures. The report expressed the need for radiation control 
standards as follows: 
... We need standards for the major categories of radiation exposure, 
based insofar as possible on risk estimates and on cost-benefit analyses 
which compare the activity involving radiation with the alternative op-
tions. Such analyses, crude though they may be at this time, are needed 
to provide a better public understanding of the issue and a sound basis 
for better public understanding.38 
These analyses should clarify such matters as: (a) the environmen-
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tal and biological risks of given developments, (b) a comparison of 
these risks with the benefits to be gained, (c) the feasibility and 
worth of reducing these environmental and biological risks, and (d) 
the net benefit to society of a given development as compared to the 
alternative options. 
Summing up its anticipations for exposure from nuclear power, 
the Comar Committee stated its conditional conclusion thusly: 
Concern about the nuclear power industry arises because of its poten-
tial magnitude and widespread distribution. Based on experience to 
date and present engineering judgment, the contribution to radiation 
exposure averaged over the U.S. population from the developing nuclear 
power industry can remain less than about 1 mrem39 per year (about 1 
percent of natural background) and the exposure of any individual kept 
to a small fraction of background provided there is: (a) attainment and 
long-term maintenance of anticipated engineering performance, (b) 
adequate management of radioactive ~astes, (c) control of sabotage and 
diversion of fissionable material, (d) avoidance of catastrophic 
accidents.39.1 
The Committee's analysis led to a statement of nine general prin-
ciples for radiation protection, some well recognized, some novel. 
Most of these applied to nuclear power. The two leading principles 
stated by the Committee were: (1) no exposure to ionizing radiation 
should be permitted without the expectation of a commensurate 
benefit; and, (2) the public must be protected from radiation but 
not to the extent that the degree of protection provided results in 
the substitution of a worse hazard for the radiation avoided. 40 
The cautious approach of the Comar Committee provides addi-
tional reason not to blithely assume that routine discharges of pre-
sumably small amounts of radioactive wastes to the environment 
are acceptable for the long term. While one nuclear powerplant may 
have a minor or negligible effect, several hundred could produce 
quite a different situation. 
Fortunately, both the EPA and the NRC are in the midst of 
rulemaking actions that should provide more information for the 
public on routine releases ofradioactive wastes. On May 5, 1975, the 
NRC announced its decision in a longstanding rulemaking proceed-
ing concerned with numerical guides for design objectives and limit-
ing conditions for operations to meet the criterion that emissions be 
as low as practicable for the type of nuclear powerplants now in 
general use in the United States.41 This step should go a long way 
toward providing the public and public interest groups with specific 
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yardsticks against which to measure the performance of nuclear 
powerplan ts. 
More recently the EPA issued proposed standards for environ-
mental radiation protection from nuclear power operations. 42 In 
announcing the proposal at a press conference on May 23, 1975, 
EPA Administrator Russell E. Train estimated the proposed stan-
dards would prevent 1,000 cases of cancer or serious genetic damage 
over the next 25 years. The cost of meeting the standards would be 
from $2 million to $3 inillion per plant. He estimated that decreas-
ing radiation emissions over the whole nuclear fuel cycle from ura-
nium ore to disposal of spent materials could cost as much as $100 
million, or about $100,000 for each life saved under the new stan-
dards.43 The proposed standards would be enforced by the NRC 
which would grant variances if it determined that a temporary and 
unusual operation condition existed and continued operation was 
necessary to protect the over-all societal interest for orderly delivery 
of electrical power, and if the information on the nature and basis 
of the variance were made public. 
The net effect of the standards, according to EPA, is to make the 
planned releases from the uranium fuel cycle of insignificant conse-
quence to individual members of the public. The standards would 
apply to planned releases only and would not deal with releases from 
a major nuclear accident. 
Nonetheless, until these proposed EPA standards become final 
and until the NRC shows that they can be attained in the operations 
of the nuclear power industry, there is good reason to remain vigi-
lant on the matter of routine releases of radioactive wastes. The 
short-and long-term consequences of misjudgment to society are 
simply too great for summary or relaxed regulatory treatment. If 
there are to be errors, let them be on the side of safety rather than 
economy. 
E. The reliability of nuclear power. 
A national commitment to large nuclear powerplants implies that 
they will be a reliable source of electricity. Mter all, would we know-
ingly commit our electrical future to sources that might fail when 
we need them most? However, if the fears of some observers are 
correct, this is precisely what lies ahead. Here again is a possible 
drawback of nuclear power for which inadequate information exists. 
Both nuclear powerplants and conventional powerplants suffer from 
troubles that can cause unscheduled outages, and these outages 
appear to increase in severity with the increasing sizes of power-
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plants.44 Nuclear critic David D. Comey45 has charged that pub-
lished AEC data reveal an average capacity of 54 percent for com-
mercial nuclear powerplants, whereas most designs call for 80 per-
cent after a three-to-four-year break-in period.48 As Comey analyzes 
nuclear powerplant performance, unless their capacity factor record 
is dramatically improved, the economic benefits claimed for them 
by their proponents are not likely to materialize. Indeed, he expects 
a decrease in plant capacity as nuclear plants get olderY 
Of course, the proponents of nuclear power do not agree that the 
situation is as bad as painted by Mr. Comey. For example, the 
Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) takes issue with simple, unqualified 
comparison of coal and nuclear powerplants and the bases for these 
comparisons.48 According to the AIF, if the performance of large 
nuclear powerplants is compared to that of the larger coal plants, 
the nuclear record is quite good, and the ability of nuclear plants 
to deliver economic electric power has been a significant factor in 
the decision of many utilities to choose nuclear power.49 Also, last 
December, Congressman Price, chairman of the Joint Committee on 
Atomic Energy, addressed Congress about a tendency of some re-
porters to exploit the sensational and to play upon the public's fears 
concerning reliability. While agreeing that plant performance could 
be bettered, he expressed his belief that nuclear plants have oper-
ated safely and are making substantial contributions to meeting 
electrical energy needs.50 
The Federal Energy Administration has entered the fray with a 
recent report that productivity of large coal-fired and nuclear plants 
can and should be improved.51 The major responsibility for achiev-
ing this productivity must be with the electric power industry, but 
the Federal Government must assist. The FEA report concluded 
that improvements in the productivity of fossil-fired and nuclear 
powerplants could help reduce U.S. dependence on foreign oil im-
ports, and could also significantly reduce the impact that increasing 
capital requirements and fuel costs are having on consumer electric 
bills. 
The NRC has received a strong recommendation52 from one of its 
staff for direct NRC intervention through licensing and other means 
of imposing standards aimed at assuring higher reliability of nuclear 
plants.53 Ironically, a new factor affecting nuclear reliability is the 
likelihood that from time to time the NRC may order one or more 
powerplants to be temporarily or permanently shut down. For ex-
ample, on January 29, 1975, the NRC directed operators of 23 nu-
clear powerplants to determine if there were cracks in piping which 
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is part of the emergency core system. The operators were given 20 
days in which to shut down the plants and make the inspections. 
NRC estimated that each plant would be shut down for about two 
weeks for the required inspections.54 This added factor of nuclear 
reliability will inevitably weigh heavily in future decisions on nu-
clear power. 
II. LEGISLATIVE MISTAKES, PAST AND PRESENT 
Several legislative mistakes have helped bring about the present 
unhealthy nuclear situation. These include the Atomic Energy Act 
of 1954,55 the Price-Anderson Act,58 and funding of ERDA. Congress 
made a profound mistake in 1954 when it rewrote the Atomic En-
ergy Act of 1946 to promote the civil use of nuclear power. 57 The 
legislation had the de facto, if unintended, effect of concentrating 
Federal funds on one energy option, namely nuclear. Neither the 
executive branch nor the Congress saw fit then or later to increase 
the funding of the Department of the Interior or the Department of 
Commerce for the parallel development and demonstration of the 
renewable energy sources, including solar energy, wind power, ocean 
heat, and also geothermal energy, energy from urban and rural 
wastes, and conservation of energy. A contributing factor was a 
coattail effect in that the AEC's funding for civil nuclear energy, 
although large in comparison with many Federal programs, was 
small in comparison to the atomic weapons program and so rode the 
weapons coattail, receiving less congressional attention during the 
great expansion of nuclear weaponry of the later 1950's than the 
level of funding warranted. 
Now, well into the 1970's, Congress finds nuclear power possessed 
with a formidable advantage over other potential new or expanded 
sources of energy in that the laboratories for nuclear energy have 
had several decades in which to become well established and to 
become productive, whereas those for alternatives are in their in-
fancy and cannot promise deliberate, practicable technology for a 
decade or so. . 
Another mistake of Congress was the enactment of the Price-
Anderson Act in 1957.58 In this Act, Congress placed a ceiling for 
liability by owners of nuclear powerplants for damages, injuries and 
casualties caused by a major nuclear accident, and also provided a 
government indemnity' of up to $500 million for liabilities exceeding 
commercially available liability insurance, which was $60 million in 
1957. The indemnification was extended in 1966 and is currently 
due to expire on August 1, 1977.59 Legislation to revise this method 
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of providing public protection was passed last year60 but was vetoed 
by President Ford.61 
The Price-Anderson Act has enabled the designers, manufactur-
ers and users of nuclear powerplants to rush ahead with new, un-
tried ideas and with an extremely rapid and perhaps unwise in-
crease in size of nuclear plants without the concern of financial 
liability in the event of mistakes and accidents. Some critics of the 
nuclear industry would cancel the Price-Anderson indemnification 
and impose full, unlimited liability for consequences of an accident 
upon the owners of nuclear powerplants. There is an appealing logic 
to this idea, which was recently developed by Friends of the Earth.62 
There are, of course, arguments made for continuation of the Price-
Anderson indemnification and from the viewpoint of nuclear indus-
try, they have merit. 63 Although this legislation provided financial 
protection to the public during the first decades of nuclear power, 
the limitation removed an important reason for the industry to be 
conservative and cautious in how it designs, builds and operates 
nuclear powerplants. The sooner the industry is required to take 
into account the financial consequences of liability from a major 
accident, the sooner safety will get a much needed boost in the 
councils of management. 
We are at the outset of a long period of inquiry, both public and 
congressional, in which the Nation will seek to understand why 
America in the years since 1954 has expended many billions of dol-
lars on nuclear power while spending hardly anything on non-
nuclear sources of energy.64 The end result of America's misguided 
energy priorities is that there is now an alarmingly uneven distribu-
tion of funds for research, development and demonstration between 
nuclear and non-nuclear options. This means that non-nuclear al-
ternatives are handicapped in catching up with nuclear power, par-
ticularly the alternatives of clean fuels from coal, more efficient 
conversion processes, and !lnvironmental protective technolog-
ices-especially for the safe burning of coal. The Ford Foundation's 
Energy Policy Project in its preliminary report examined Federal 
funding for some $2.4 billion spent during this time for nuclear 
power in comparison with $2.7 billion for all other energy options.65 
One reason for creating the ERDA was to remedy this national 
preoccupation for Federal funding of research and development of 
nuclear energy, to the detriment of other alternatives.66 President 
Nixon, in proposing this new Federal agency, promised that it would 
pursue all promising energy technologies. In his Message to Con-
gress on June 29, 1973, he stated: "The new Administration would 
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be organized to give sufficient new emphasis to fossil fuels and 
potential new forms of energy while also assuring continued progress 
in developing nuclear power" [emphasis supplied].67 
Despite these initial assurances, there are few signs that ERDA 
is reorienting its funding priorities for energy research and qevelop-
ment. Rather, it appears that there has been a continued emphasis 
on nuclear research and development and a perpetuation of the 
imbalance which has left us with few new options to increase our 
energy supplies for the near term. A recent analysis of the budget 
of the ERDA by Congressman Charles Yanik amply demonstrates 
the one-sidedness of the Administration's continued preoccupation 
with nuclear power.68 Mr. Yanik's study shows that direct research 
and development for non-nuclear energy alternatives-coal, solar, 
geothermal-count for a little over one-tenth of the ERDA's total 
budget. On the other hand, excluding administrative costs, over 78 
percent of the budget is related directly to research and develop-
ment of various applications of nuclear energy, with less than one 
percent for conservation of energy and barely 5 percent for nuclear 
safety.69 
The Congress, however, has moved substantially to authorize and 
fund more research and development for energy. Legislation passed 
by the 93d Congress that emphasized energy research and develop-
ment included the Solar Energy Research, Development and 
Demonstration Act,70 the Geothermal Energy Research, Develop-
ment and Demonstration Act of 1974,71 the Solar Heating and Cool-
ing Demonstration Act of 1973,72 and the Non-Nuclear Energy Re-
search and Development Act.73 In addition, Section 305 ofthe Hous-
ing and Community Development Act of 197474 requires the Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development to promote, to the maxi-
mum extent feasible, use of energy saving techniques through mini-
mum property standards for newly constructed residential housing 
financed by mortgages insured under the Act. This legislation un-
derscores the bright hopes of the Congress to expand promising and 
needed alternative energy sources. Unfortunately, a look at the 
ERDA budget for fiscal year 1976 indicates that the Administration 
does not share this hope and has not responded to the opportunities 
intended by Congress. One analysis submitted shows that for solar 
energy, ERDA proposes to spend only a little over 1 percent of its 
funds for this alternative, renewable energy source.75 We cannot 
expect dramatic breakthroughs in these alternative sources for en-
ergy if we continue to orient our money so heavily towards nuclear 
energy. 
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With the benefit o.f hindsight, it is evident that a majo.r mistake 
was made in co.ncentrating upo.n the develo.pment o.f nuclear po.wer 
witho.ut the parallel and equally intensive develo.pment o.f o.ther 
alternatives. It is no.w time to. put the available Federal funds where 
they can be used to. best advantage fo.r the further develo.pment and 
demo.nstratio.n o.f energy so.urces alternative to. nuclear po.wer.lfthis 
means cutting back o.n nuclear po.wer to. free funds fo.r alternatives, 
so. be it. The step must be taken. On the o.ther hand, nuclear 
research and develo.pment sho.uld no.t be reduced witho.ut at least a 
co.rrespo.nding increase in funding fo.r alternatives. It is bad eno.ugh 
to. be almo.st who.lly dependent no.w o.n nuclear po.wer fo.r a new 
energy so.urce in the sho.rt term. It wo.uld be still wo.rse to cut back 
that o.ptio.n with no. alternative to take its place. 
III. A PRo.POSED SOLUTION 
As o.ne listens to. the evo.lving debate o.n nuclear po.wer, it is plain 
that if a majo.r release o.f radio.active materials were to. o.ccur because 
o.f an accident at a nuclear po.werplant, there co.uld be widespread 
death, injury and pro.perty damage. The growing sho.rtages o.f do.-
mestic o.il and gas supplies, ho.wever, are increasing the pressure 
upo.n go.vernment and utilities to. build and use nuclear po.wer-
plants, especially if we expect electricity to. beco.me a do.minant 
energy fo.rm in the future. Oppo.nents warn o.f grave dangers. Pro.-
po.nents co.ncede that nuclear po.wer can never be zero. risk but 
claim that the pro.bability o.f a catastrophic accident is so. vanish-
ingly small as to. justify so.ciety incurring the risk. Debate is full o.f 
statements o.f o.pinio.n, judgments, biases, all to.o. o.ften suppo.rted 
by limited or inco.mplete info.rmatio.n. 
So.me Members o.f Co.ngress wo.uld reso.lve the dilemma by declar-
ing a tempo.rary mo.rato.rium o.n further use o.f nuclear po.wer until 
all questio.ns can be answered. Others wo.uld impo.se a permanent 
mo.rato.rium no.w, based upo.n their analyses o.f likely risks. In 1974 
Co.ngressman Waldie intro.duced a pro.po.sed Nuclear Energy Reap-
praisal Act78 to. terminate the granting o.f co.nstructio.n permits fo.r 
nuclear po.werplants and to. require a five-year study o.f the nuclear 
fuel cycle befo.re issuance o.f co.nstructio.n permits co.uld be resumed. 
Co.ngressman Fish intro.duced a similar bill in this Co.ngress.77 
There can be little questio.n that many Members o.f Co.ngress 
wo.uld be a go.o.d deal mo.re receptive to a nuclear mo.rato.rium if the 
present energy crisis did no.t exist. In the Natio.n as a who.le, nuclear 
energy supplies seven percent o.fthe generating capacity, while New 
England already is 22 percent dependent upo.n nuclear energy and 
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its utilities have been advised to move more towards nuclear 
power.78 
It is quite probable that a licensing moratorium would compel the 
government and nuclear industry to develop and present the Ameri-
can public with the real facts underlying nuclear power. SuclI mora-
torium pressure to finish such a study would be great, and as a 
result, answers would be forthcoming. However, for Congress to 
adopt a nuclear moratorium, there would have to be evidence which 
is generally supported throughout the scientific and technological 
communities. Although there is a serious division among some sci-
entists and in the general populace concerning the wisdom of a 
further national commitment to nuclear power, the evidence is not 
conclusive. Without consensus, a moratorium on nuclear develop-
ment should not be imposed. 
Nonetheless, there is plainly good cause for concern about the 
long-term future of nuclear power. Without an independent evalua-
tion of these concerns by a genuinely impartial, unbiased body of 
scientists and engineers and members of the public, there is no way 
for Congress to make an informed judgment on fission-based energy. 
The introduction of a Nuclear Energy Study Act of 1975,19 is an 
expression of the belief that it is now incumbent on Congress to 
order such a study. The bill would require the Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA) to conduct a study of the entire nuclear fuel 
cycle.80 The OTA would be authorized to contract with individuals 
or organizations for the purpose of conducting the study, upon the 
condition that the contractors have no interest in the further expan-
sion of the nuclear industry. 
The comprehensive study by the OTA would include a review of 
many important areas. These topics would pertain to the safety and 
environmental hazards associated with existing nuclear fission pow-
erplants, the effects of routine emissions, the environmental and 
safety aspects of perpetual storage of high level radioactive wastes, 
the feasibility of denaturing these wastes,81 the transportation of 
nuclear and radioactive materials, the risks associated with theft of 
nuclear materials and sabotage of nuclear facilities, and the eco-
nomic effect of decisions to proceed with nuclear power or to stop 
use of nuclear power. 
In addition, the bill would require the OTA to report annually to 
the Congress and the public on the progress of the study. Through 
these reports the Congress will insure that the study is being pro-
perly conducted and that governmental agencies are giving their full 
cooperation to the OTA. As for the level of effort, because of the 
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critical nature of the decision to be made based upon the report, 
authorization is proposed of $2 million a year, or a total of $10 
million for the study. 
In summation, before we proceed much further in a "Faustian 
bargain" with nuclear energy, Congress should have at hand infor-
mation and analysis specially compiled for it to help decide just how 
far the Nation should go. It is not enough simply to read reports of 
parties with special interests for and against nuclear energy, and to 
listen to their briefs and arguments in hearings. These proceedings 
often take on the quality of those arguments long ago as to how 
many angels could dance upon the head of a pin-too much supposi-
tion and too little substance. The Congress needs a major study and 
analysis performed by an agency identified with the legislature, and 
not by Federal agencies that would promote or regulate nuclear 
power, or by the industrial concerns that would sell and use nuclear 
powerplants, or by opponents who now have acquried a vested inter-
est in their opposition.82 
FOOTNOTES 
* Expanded from a presentation given at the Nuclear Energy 
Symposium, sponsored by the Center for Law and Health Sciences 
and the Environmental Law Society of Boston University on Febru-
ary 22, 1975. The author is indebted to the Environmental Policy 
Division of the Congressional Research Service for extensive assis-
tance in the preparation of this article. 
** United States Congressman from Massachusetts. 
1 The term "technological fix" is associated with Dr. Alvin Wein-
berg, a leading nuclear scientist and former directer of the Oak 
Ridge National Laboratory. 
2 Representatives of the Energy Research and Development Ad-
ministration (ERDA) in their appearance before the Joint Commit-
tee on Atomic Energy on June 10, 1975, forecast that by the end of 
the century electric energy inputs to our society will account for half 
of the total energy input and that nuclear energy will increase from 
4 percent of total electric generating capacity in 1973 to between 40 
and 57 percent by the year 2000, with nuclear generating capacity 
increasing from 18.4 gigawatts to between 625 and 1250 gigawatts 
by the year 2000. 
3 The start of the nuclear age is dated in January 1939, when 
nuclear fission was discovered by the German chemists L. Meitner 
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and O.R. Frisch. 
4 A gigawatt is one million kilowatts. Modem large electric pow-
erplants range in electrical capacity from 0.8 gigawatts to 1.5 giga-
watts and there are discussions of establishing power parks at which 
many powerplants would be located together, with total ge:q.erating 
capacities of 10 gigawatts or more. 
5 Statement of Roger W. R. LeGassie before the Ad Hoc Subcom-
mittee to review the National Breeder Reactor Program, June 10, 
1975. 
8 121 CONGo REC. 135-138 (daily ed. Jan. 15, 1975) (THE STATE OF 
THE UNION-ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES); H. 
R. Doc. No. 94-3, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 135-138 (1975). 
7 The President's expectation would be filled with nuclear power-
plants now being built or planned. The ERDA representatives cau-
tioned the Joint Committee that determining the nuclear portion of 
future U.S. electric generating capacity is particularly difficult. The 
recent financial problems of utilities have had evident effects on the 
capital intensive nuclear plants. While low nuclear fuel costs may 
strongly favor the construction of nuclear plants, the long lead time 
for their licensing and construction and their high initial cost, to-
gether with public acceptance problems, tend to offset some of this 
incentive to the utilities to choose nuclear power. Supra note 5, at 
877-79. 
8 As an example of views questioning a nuclear future, in April 
1975 Senator Gravel testified at hearings on nuclear power by the 
House Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and analyzed the 
growing antinuclear sentiment in the United States. 121 CONGo REC. 
7877-79 (daily ed. May 5, 1975) (remarks of Senator Gravel). 
In another example, Senator Gravel placed in the Congressional 
Record of October 8, 1973, excerpts from the Statement of the Con-
tinuing Committee of the 23d Pugwash Conference on Science and 
World Affairs, which raised serious questions of radioactive pollu-
tion of the environment from nuclear power. 119 CONGo BEc. 18727-
28 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1973). 
As an example of scientific views favoring nuclear power, on 
March 11, 1975, Congressman Moorhead placed in the 
Congressional Record the text of a statement of 32 leading scien-
tists, headed by Dr. Hans Bethe, explaining why they saw no alter-
native to nuclear power. 121 CONGo REC. 1015 (daily ed. March 11, 
1975). 
9 Fortunately, Congress has created a new analytical arm, the 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) , which can provide the 
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analysis and assessment needed. OTA was established in the legis-
lative branch by the Technology Assessment Act of 1972 (86 Stat. 
797). The basic function of the OTA is to provide assessments for 
congresssional committees of the beneficial and adverse impacts of 
technologies, together with analyses of alternatives. 
10 On August 4, 1972, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) had 
specified that a principal objective of the Reactor Safety Study was 
to " ... try to reach some meaningful conclusions about the risks of 
nuclear accidents using current technology." When the present 
state of knowledge would not permit a complete analysis of low-
probability accidents in nuclear plants with desired precision, the 
study was to consider the uncertainty and the consequent range in 
predictions, as well as to delineate outstanding problems. Subse-
quently, the study group expanded its charter to include the follow-
ing specific objectives: (1) a quantitative assessment of the risk to 
the public from reactor accidents, (2) a more realistic assessment 
than that of the approach of the licensing process, (3) development 
of methods to perform the assessment and to understand their limi-
tations, and (4) identification of areas for future safety research. 
11 U.S. ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION, REACTOR SAFETY STUDY: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCIDENT RISKS IN U. S. COMMERCIAL NUCLEAR 
POWERPLANTS (AEC Report, WASH-1400, draft 1974). 
12 The Reactor Safety Study reported indications that nuclear 
powerplants have achieved a relatively low level of risk compared 
to many other activities in which our society engages (Id. at 223). 
As for quantitative results, the report commented on reactor risks 
as follows: 
Reactor risks are presented to be smaller than many other man-made 
and natural risks to which we are exposed as a society and as individu-
als. These other risks include those due to fires, explosions, dam failures, 
air travel, toxic chemicals, tornadoes, hurricanes and earthquakes. (Id.). 
The report predicted that the operation of 100 power reactors 
would not contribute measurably to the overall risks due to acute 
fatalities and property damage from either man-made or natural 
causes (Id. at 226). Concerning large consequence accidents, the 
report stated: 
Potential core melt accidents, occurring under typical or average values 
of radioactive release, weather, and exposed population, would have 
modest consequences. The reason that probabilities are much smaller 
for large consequence events is that all the factors affecting conse-
quences must be at or near their worst condition. Thus, they require a 
core melt accident coupled with unfavorable weather conditions and a 
very high population density exposed to the released radioactivity. 
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Since the accident, the population, and the weather are generally inde-
pendent, large consequence events are quite unlikely. (Id.) 
13 The Union of Concerned Scientists, which opposes nuclear 
power, on Nov. 14, 1974, reported its review of the Rasmussen report 
by a committee of scientists and engineers from the Sierra Club and 
the UCS. This joint review found the Rasmussen report to have 
serious limitations and defects and said it "cannot be used to sweep 
away the doubts about reactor safety." Dr. Henry W. Kendall of 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, spokesman for the review 
group, said that the only technical basis for the AEC's nuclear 
safety claims was a "speculative and unverified computer predic-
tion that relies on a wide range of poorly founded and inconsistent 
assumptions." H. W. KENDALL & S. MOGLEWER, JOINT REVIEW COM-
MITTEE OF THE SIERRA CLUB, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS: PRE-
LIMINARY REVIEW OF AEC REACTOR SAFETY (1974). See also, Union of 
Concerned Scientists, news release, Cambridge, Massachusetts 
(Nov. 24, 1974). Senator Gravel placed materials critical of the Ras-
mussen report in 120 CONGo REC. 5012-24 (daily ed. July 25, 1974) 
and 120 CONGo REC. 20757-60 (daily ed. Dec. 9, 1974). 
In December, 1974, the Environmental Protection Agency 
damned the report with faint praise. EPA wrote to the AEC about 
its preliminary review of the report and said it was imperative the 
report receive a thorough critical review by the general technical 
community and public. EPA called for significant expansion of the 
description of certain critical portions of the overall calculations to 
permit a "clear understanding of the relationships between the radi-
oactive material release, its dispersion, population distribution, and 
the resulting health effects." EPA also noted that although the re-
port indicated no absolute judgment on nuclear power acceptabil-
ity was intended, the comparative risk analysis highlighted in the 
summary might well imply an acceptability judgment to the aver-
age reader. EPA suggested the AEC indicate that judgments on risk 
acceptability are extremely complex, with comparative risk evalua-
tions representing only one of numerous inputs which must be con-
sidered. Letter from W. D. Rowe, EPA, to S. Levine, AEC, Nov. 24, 
1974. The EPA response was also discussed in R. Giliette, EPA 
Cites Errors in AEC's Reactor Risk Study, 186 SCIENCE 1008 (1974). 
An editorial in 30 THE BULLETIN OF THE ATOMIC SCIENTISTS, No. 
8, Oct., 1974, while noting several benefits of the report, was critical 
of it on six counts which it summarized as follows: The question of 
risks involved in operation of commercial nuclear powerplants is 
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of sufficient importance to require an assessment of unimpeachable 
thoroughness and impartiality. The Rasmussen report, for all the 
merits it may have, does not meet that requirement. 
14 AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF PHYSICS, REPORT TO THE AMERICAN PHYSI-
CAL SOCIETY BY THE STUDY GROUP ON LIGHT-WATER REACTOR SAFETY, 
various pagings (1975); to be published in THE REVIEW OF MODERN 
PHYSICS (hereinafter cited as LEWIS REPORT). 
15 Most of the nuclear power reactors in the United States are 
varieties of the so-called light-water reactor in which water is used 
as the coolant and moderator of the nuclear core. 
18 The Study Group made eight major recommendations in the 
Lewis report which called for: (1) human engineering of reactor 
controls; (2) measures to quantify the effectiveness of quality assur-
ance in construction of nuclear reactors; (3) additional calculations 
in the final version of the Rasmussen report; (4) revision of the 
Rasmussen report analysis of accident consequences; (5) study of 
the problem of sabotage and its effect on increasing the risk of 
radioactivity release; (6) quantification of the safety margin for the 
design of emergency core cooling systems with increased emphasis 
on realistic calculations and experiments; (7) more emphasis on 
certain safety research including an assessment of benefits and costs 
of alternative siting policies such as remote, underground, and 
nuclear-park siting; (8) more effort to resolve major uncertainties in 
estimating consequences of accidents and to mitigate their conse-
quences; and (9) further improvements in safety research to assure 
that results of both experimental and computer analyses are openly 
published. LEWIS REPORT, supra note 14. 
17 According to the Lewis report, the last line of defense in pre-
venting or mitigating the release of radioactivity from a nuclear 
power reactor is a further set of engineered safety features designed 
as a backstop in case of significant failure of the reactor's safety 
features. The greater part of this last safety umbrella is the contain-
ment and building which encloses the entire reactor and those parts 
that contain radioactive materials. These containments have 
worked well in controlling routine and minor emissions, but have 
not yet been subjected to test by a large-scale controlled or acciden-
tal release. More research is needed, according to the report, toward 
increasing the effectiveness of containment devices, along with more 
vigorous pursuit of the possibilities for major improvements in con-
tainment design. 
The Lewis report estimated substantially larger long-term conse-
quences of a major release than did the Rasmussen report, particu-
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larly concerning damage to or denial of use of land and possible 
latent cancers from exposure to individuals who live in areas which 
are contaminated below the evacuation thresholds of the Rasmus-
sen report. The Lewis report noted that these uncertainties in esti-
mates of consequences need to be resolved because they have impor-
tant implications in reactor design, siting policy and protection 
against potential sabotage. "In analyzing the societal risk-benefit 
balance of commercial nuclear reactors, one must be able to esti-
mate with reasonable confidence both the probability and conse-
quences of system failure; research must continue on both." LEWIS 
REPORT, supra note 14. 
18 These two categories of questions are defined by a leading 
safety expert of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, W. B. Cottrell, 
in his article The ECCS Rulemaking Hearings, 15 NUCLEAR SAFETY 
30-56 (Jan.-Feb. 1974) (hereinafter cited as Cottrell). 
19 According to the NRC, the experimental program for LOFT, for 
which $14.3 million was requested for Fiscal Year 1976, is directed 
toward testing predictions of core and reactor response following a 
loss-of-coolant accident. The need for such information has been 
emphasized by regulatory groups. The program objectives are to 
evaluate the adequacy of analytical techniques for assessing per-
formance of engineered safety systems, evaluate the performance 
and safety margin of engineered safety systems, and identify un-
anticipated behavior not presently accounted for in evaluating the 
performance of engineered safety systems. Hearings on Authorizing 
Legislation, Fiscal Year 1976, Before the Joint Comm. on Atomic 
Energy, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 84 
(1975). 
20 The adequacy of ECCS systems has become and remains a 
focal point of contention between proponents and opponents of nu-
clear power. The controversy has raged for several years and pre-
sents an extraordinary picture of charge and counter-charge, of sus-
picions that the AEC had muzzled some of its own staff and the 
employees of its contractors who have had questions about the sys-
tem, and of intervenors prying out these unfavorable views from 
AEC documents. One major battlefield for this controversy was the 
ECCS Rulemaking Hearing conducted by the AEC from January 
27, 1972 to July 25, 1973. For two accounts of these hearings from 
different viewpoints, see Cottrell, supra note 18, and D. F. FORD and 
H. W. KENDALL, AN ASSESSMENT OF THE EMERGENCY CORE COOLING 
SYSTEMS RULEMAKING HEARINGS, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS 
(1974) (hereinafter cited as FORD & KENDALL). Cottrell gives a rea-
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sonably impartial account of the hearings, while Ford and Kendall 
recount in detail the issues raised by the Union of Concerned Scien-
tists during the ECCS hearings. The hearings also are analyzed from 
the viewpoint of public participation by S. EBBIN AND R. KASPER in 
CITIZENS GROUPS AND THE NUCLEAR POWER CONTROVERSY (1974). 
During the hearings, questioning brought out that in December, 
1971, the director of nuclear safety for the Oak Ridge National Lab-
oratory had written to the AEC's Director of Regulation, noting that 
since the hearings on the ECCS had been announced by the AEC, 
it was appropriate for his group to advise the AEC of their views. 
Director Cottrell summed up the thrust of his letter by writing: "To 
summarize what follows herein, we are not certain that the interim 
criteria for the ECCS adopted by the AEC will. . . , 'provide rea-
sonable assurance that such systems will be effective in the un-
likely event of a loss-of-coolant accident.' " (FORD & KENDALL, 4.21). 
The 6-page letter sent by Cottrell was accompanied by a 30-page 
attachment detailing several serious criticisms of the AEC's interim 
policy statement on the ECCS. Cottrell emphasized the inadequacy 
of the state of knowledge on loss-of-coolant accidents and emer-
gency core cooling systems, saying: "At the present time we would 
not presume to offer 'realistic' criteria because of wide gaps in our 
knowledge. However, we would welcome the opportunity to work 
with others in developing interim criteria. Final criteria cannot be 
developed until more experimental evidence becomes avail-
able .... " Id. at 4.22. 
Although the AEC had published a notice of the ECCS Rulemak-
ing Hearing, and Cottrell's letter had referenced this notice, the 
AEC did not put his letter in the docket for the hearings. Instead, 
it was reportedly withdrawn on the grounds that it was a draft and 
did not represent the views of the safety group at Oak Ridge. During 
cross-examination of Cottrell by UCS at the rulemaking hearings, 
Cottrell said that the letter in his judgment was in its final form 
when sent to the AEC, that it did not represent a draft, and that it 
did represent the views of the ECCS researchers at Oak Ridge. Id. 
at 4.22. 
This situation gives reason to wonder how the AEC balanced its 
dual responsibilities for fostering nuclear power and regulating it in 
the interests of public health and safety-a conflict of interest that 
was only partially resolved by the creation of the independent Nu-
clear Regulatory Commission by the Energy Reorganization Act of 
1974, P.L. 94-438, 88 Stat. 1233, approved October 11, 1974. 
One must also be discouraged by the state of the nuclear art when 
genuinely knowledgeable persons can have doubts of the kind exhib-
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ited by the intervenors in the ECCS Rulemaking Hearings. 
21 The two most likely illicit uses of stolen materials would be to 
make crude nuclear explosive devices or, in the case of plutonium, 
to make a terror device to disperse this dangerous material in a 
populated place. For a detailed, recent treatment of the likelihood 
of these risks and the possibility that terrorists indeed could succeed 
in making such devices, see, M. WILLRICH & T. B. TAYLOR, NUCLEAR 
THEFT: RISKS AND SAFEGUARDS (1974). 
22 This warning was delivered to the Senate Committee on Gov-
ernmental Operations on March 12, 1974. Hearings to Establish a 
Development Administration, and a Nuclear Safety and Licencing 
Commission Before the Subcomm. on Reorganization of Research 
and International Organization of the Senate Comm. on Govern-
mental Operations, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 107 (1974). 
23 Id. 
24 U. S. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO 
THE CONGRESS ON IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED IN THE PROGRAM FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF SPECIAL NUCLEAR MATERIALS, REpORT B-164105 
(1973). 
25 Senator Ribicoff published this report in 120 CONGo REC. 6621-
30 (daily ed. April 30, 1974). 
26 Id. at 6623. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 As an illustration of a recent move by the Congress to inform 
itself on nuclear safeguards, the Senate Committee on Government 
Operations published a landmark compendium on this subject. 
SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, PEACEFUL NUCLEAR Ex-
PORTS AND WEAPONS PROLIFERATION: A COMPENDIUM, 94th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1975). 
30 The notion of a "Faustian bargain" was developed by the noted 
nuclear scientist Alvin Weinberg, formerly director of the Oak Ridge 
National Laboratory. Writing in SCIENCE in 1972, Dr. Weinberg 
said: "We nuclear people have made a Faustian bargain with so-
ciety. On the one hand, we offer-in the catalytic nuclear 
burner-an inexhaustible source of energy. Even in the short range, 
when we use ordinary reactors, we offer energy that is cheaper than 
energy from fossil fuel. Moreover, this source of energy, when pro-
perly handled, is almost nonpolluting. . . 
But the price that we demand of society for this magical energy 
source is both a vigilance and a longevity of our social institutions 
that we are quite unaccustomed to. In a way, all of this was antici-
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pated during the old debates over nuclear weapons. 
It seems to me ... that peaceful nuclear energy probably will 
make demands of the same sort on our society, and possibly of even 
longer duration. To be sure, we shall steadily improve the technol-
ogy of nuclear energy; but short of developing a truly successful 
thermonuclear reactor, we shall never be totally free of concern over 
reactor safety, transport of r~dioactive materials and waste dis-
posal. ... " Weinberg, Social Institutions and Nuclear Energy, 177 
SCIENCE 27-34 (1972). 
31 The conventional ideas are to solidify these wastes, to combine 
them into glass or asphalt or some other inert form, and then either 
to store these solid wastes in a permanent mausoleum, or to put 
them in holes in salt mines. A complicating factor is that these 
wastes are so radioactive they become and remain quite hot, so that 
there may be heat disposal problems at the place of storage. 
32 ERDA has large nuclear reactors which produce plutonium for 
weapons. These are located near Richland, Washington, and Savan-
nah River, Georgia. The fission product wastes from these reactors 
are stored in liquid form in large storage tanks at these two loca-
tions. Recently the AEC, and now ERDA, have begun to solidify 
some of these wastes for long-term storage. 
33 The story of these leaks was analyzed by Gillette in Radiation 
Spill at Hanford: The Anatomy of An Accident, 181 SCIENCE 728-30 
(1973). More recently, Senator Cannon placed in the Congressional 
Record statements for and against the AEC proposal to develop the 
storage of radioactive wastes at the AEC's Nevada test site. 121 
CONGo REC. 1919-22 (daily ed. Feb. 17, 1975). 
The potential dangers that such wastes might escape from their 
confinement and contaminate land or water was one factor underly-
ing strong criticisms in Congress of AEC plans to install a perma-
nent nuclear waste dump in a central Kansas salt mine. Indeed, 
Representative Skubitz of Kansas during 1971 and 1972 successfully 
challenged the AEC. He testified against the proposal before the 
Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, kept the issue alive in the 
Congressional Record, and helped to publicize information about 
the faults and errors of the plan that led the AEC to abandon this 
project. Illustrations of the pressure upon the AEC can be found in 
117CONG.REc.4338,7294, 14947, 19165,26222,26522,27316,31636, 
32724 (1971); 118 CONGo REc. 39, 512, 4128, 4864 (1972). 
34 There may be a risk for opponents of nuclear power in raising 
issues of morality, for the others can inquire into the morality of this 
generation of human beings consuming most of the known reserves 
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of oil and gas and so depriving all future generations of their use for 
energy or for chemical feed materials. Which then is the more im-
moral act: to bequeath fission products to posterity and save some 
oil and gas for them, or to use up remaining oil and gas faster than 
ever by not using nuclear power? 
35 The Atomic Energy Commission in its final environmental 
statement for the proposed Pilgrim Nuclear Power Station Unit 2 
near the town of Plymouth, Massachusetts, provided information on 
the typical regulatory approach and kinds of wastes likely to be 
routinely discharged. In discussing radwaste systems, the Septem-
ber 1974 AEC report stated: 
During the operation of Pilgrim Station, radioactive materials will be 
produced by fission and neutron activation of corrosion products in the 
primary coolant. From the radioactive material produced, small 
amounts of gaseous and liquid radioactive wastes will enter the waste 
streams. These streams will be processed and monitored for radioactiv-
ity within the station to reduce (but not elimimate) the quantities of 
radionuclides ultimately released to the atmosphere and to Cape Cod 
Bay ... 
The AEC's impact statement estimated that releases of radioac-
tive materials in liquid wastes would be approximately 3.5 curies 
per year, excluding tritium and dissolved gases. For gaseous waste, 
the principal source would be gases stripped from the primary 
coolant, with additional sources from the main condenser air ejector 
off-gases, ventilation exhausts, and gases collected in the reactor 
containment building. The AEC calculated that the plant's gaseous 
waste management system would release about 1200 curies per year 
of noble gases and negligible amounts ofradioactive iodine. In addi-
tion, some 350 curies of tritium would be released to the water. In 
discussing the environmental impact of these releases, the AEC 
reported no detectable radiological impact would be expected in the 
aquatic biota or terrestrial mammals as a result of the releases into 
Cape Cod Bay and into the air at the station. As for the impact upon 
persons living within 50 miles of the station, the AEC estimated 
that maximum individual exposures from liquid and gaseous re-
leases would be only a few percent of the natural background expo-
sure of 0.1 mrem per year, would be below the normal variation in 
background dose, and would represent no measurable radiological 
impact. REPORT, UNITED STATES ATOMIC ENERGY COMMISSION (Direc-
torate of Licensing: Final Environmental Statement related to the 
proposed Pilgrim Nuclear Power Unit 2. Boston Edison Company), 
Sept., 1974 (various pagings). 
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38 NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE BIOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF IONIZING RADIA-
TIONS, REPORT ON THE EFFECTS ON POPULATIONS OF EXPOSURE TO Low 
LEVELS OF IONIZING RADIATIONS (1972) (hereinafter cited COMAR 
REPORT). 
37 Professor Comar was then Chairman of the Department of 
Physical Biology, New York State Veterinary College, Cornell Uni-
versity. 
38 COMAR REPORT, supra note 36, at 7. 
39 The term "mrem" means a milli-rem, which is a small unit of 
radiation exposure. 
39.1 [d. 
40 Additionally, there should not be attempted the reduction of 
small risks even further at the cost of large sums of money that spent 
otherwise would clearly produce greater benefit. 
Other principles included: 
-There should be an upper limit on man-made non-medical ex-
posure for individuals in the general population such that the risk 
of serious injury from somatic effects in such individuals is very 
small relative to risks that are normally accepted. 
-There should be an upper limit on man-made non-medical ex-
posure for the general population. Average exposure permitted for 
the population should be considerably lower than the upper limit 
permitted to individuals. 
-Guidance for the nuclear power industry should be established 
on the basis of cost-benefit analysis, particularly taking into ac-
count the total biological and environmental risks of the various 
options available and the cost-effectiveness of reducing these risks. 
-In addition to normal operating conditions in the nuclear indus-
try, careful consideration should be given to the probabilities and 
estimated effects of uncontrolled releases. It has been estimated 
that a catastrophic accident leading to melting of the core of a large 
nuclear reactor could result in mortality comparable to that of a 
severe natural disaster. Hence extraordinary efforts to minimize this 
risk are clearly called for. COMAR REPORT, supra note 36. 
41 LICENSING OF PRODUCTION AND UTIUZATION FACIUTIES, 40 Fed. 
Reg. 19439-43 (1975). In December, 1970, the AEC published a 
regulation specifying that design and operating requirements for 
nuclear powerplants keep levels of radioactivity in effluents as low 
as practicable. 35 Fed. Reg. 18385-88 (1970). Subsequently AEC 
published for comment changes to provide numerical guides for 
limiting conditions of operation of light-water cooled power reactors. 
36 Fed. Reg. 1166 (1971). Soon after, the AEC announced a public 
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rulemaking hearing on the proposed change. 36 Fed. Reg. 1544 
(1971). The hearings began on Jan. 20, 1972, and continued, with 
interruptions, to Dec. 6, 1973. The AEC heard oral arguments on 
June 6, 1974. Major issues of controversy involved the feasibility 
of achieving the proposed numerical criteria and the cost of compli-
ance with and the perceived benefits of the criteria. 
In announcing its decision on numerical guidelines, the NRC said 
it fully subscribes to the general principle that, within established 
radiation protection guides, radiation exposures to the public 
should be kept as low as practicable, taking into account the state 
of technology and the economics of improvements in relation to the 
benefits to the public health and safety and the use of atomic energy 
in the public interest. In addition, the NRC announced it was di-
recting its staff to prepare and issue for public comment a proposed 
rule to substitute the currently accepted phrasing "as low as is 
reasonably achievable" for the older, less precise terminology. 
42 40 Fed. Reg. 23420-25 (1975). 
43 ENERGY USERS REPORT, at A.13 (1975). 
44 Conventional and nuclear powerplants are now being ordered 
in sizes of 1000 megawatts and up. By way of comparison, the total 
generating capacity of the Boston Edison Company in 1973 was 
2,658 megawatts which supplied some 469,000 residential custom-
ers, 61,971 commercial, 826 industrial and 192 other for a total of 
531,989 customers. ELECTRICAL WORLD DIRECTORY OF ELECTRIC 
UTILITIES 339 (82d ed. 1973). 
45 Director of Environmental Research for Business and Profes-
sional People for the Public Interest, Chicago, Ill. 
46 D. COMEY, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RELIABILITY, A REPORT TO THE 
FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION 1, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEO-
PLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, PUB. No. BPI-7444 (1974). 
47 In a subsequent paper, Corney asked whether nuclear plants 
could sustain a 20 percent increase in their average capacity factor, 
and then answered in the negative, stating: 
One factor, at least, suggests not. Because of the radioactivity of the 
reactor and primary coolant systems in light-water reactors, repairs on 
these systems take more time and more workers than similar repairs on 
coal-fired plants. In order to avoid exceeding each worker's maximum 
permissible radiation exposure, a large number of men must work se-
quentially within a confined space to make repairs on nuclear reactor 
systems. For example, at Commonwealth Edison's Dresden Nuclear 
Power Station, a recent prolonged outage took 350 to make repairs that 
12 men could have done quickly on a fossil-fired plant. 
D. COMEY, NUCLEAR POWER PLANT RELIABILITY: THE 1973-1974 RE-
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CORD 6, BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONAL PEOPLE FOR THE PUBLIC INTEREST, 
PUB. No. BPI-7507 (1975). Comey generalized that since the ra-
dioactivity of these plant systems increases with plant age, repairs 
are likely to become even more time consuming as the plant gets 
older, leading to longer outages and decreased capacity factors. 
48 Reliability of Nuclear Power Plants, AIF BACKGROUND INFOR-
MATION, Issue No. 82, at 3 (1974). 
49 According to the AIF, Commonwealth Edison in Chicago, 
which owns 22 percent of the Nation's nuclear capacity, found that 
during the 12 months ending March 31, 1974, its four large nuclear 
units averaged 80.2 percent availability, compared to 68.8 percent 
for their five large coal-fired plants. Id. at 2. 
50 120 CONGo REC. 11793 (daily ed., Dec. 12, 1974). 
51 FEDERAL ENERGY ADMINISTRATION, A REPORT ON IMPROVING THE 
PRODUCTIVITY OF ELECTRIC POWERPLANTS, U.S. Govt. Printing Office, 
Stock No. 041-018, 00056-9 (1975). 
52 NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 32-33 (March 1975). The recommendation 
was made by Edwin G. Triner, NRC director of program analysis. 
He outlined five steps by NRC to improve reliability of operation, 
including: (1) expanded collection and analysis of failure data by 
the utilities; (2) working with State public utility commissions to 
educate them on the relationship between design investment and 
operating and maintenance costs; (3) modification of NRC license 
applications to require utilities to explicitly identify plans for assur-
ing high reliability; (4) using NASA's experience with systems relia-
bility; and (5) selective interaction by NRC with officials of public 
utilities and architect-engineers to express its interests in improved 
system reliability and to solicit their ideas. 
53 The industry apparently has shown little interest in regulatory 
effects by NRC to improve reliability. ENERGY USERS REPORT, at A-
13 (April 1975) . However, in April 1975, the chairman of the Edison 
Electric Institute, Robert F. Gilkeson, said at the American Power 
Conference that significant improvement of plant availability must 
be a major goal. ELECTRICAL WEEK, at 6 (April 1975), Gilkeson was 
critical of custom designing rather than standard design of large 
powerplants and called for a slowdown in plant size escalation and 
application of quality assurance and quality control as ways to im-
prove powerplant availability. 
54 NRC Press Release No.8, 75-13 (Jan. 29, 1975). On February 
5, 1975, Chairman Anders of the NRC was called before the Joint 
Committee on Atomic Energy to explain this action. His remarks 
give an insight into the still-forming philosophy of this new commis-
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sion which was created by Congress to eliminate the old conflict of 
interest within the AEC between its functions of fostering and regu-
lating nuclear power. Mr. Anders stated: 
We do not view our task as an easy one. We and our staff know that 
it is the nature of regulation to be faced with many difficult and complex 
decisions where often the deciding factor boils down to judgment. When 
an issue is not clear, our approach will be one of prudence ... In keeping 
with this approach, the Commission's judgment to issue the inspection 
directive last week was based on careful consideration of the NRC staff's 
recommendation and their evaluation of the facts available, and on the 
Commission's intent to be prudent in dealing with matters which could 
potentially affect public health and safety. 
As for the action itself, Mr. Anders explained: 
Gentlemen, there are those who may feel that the action taken by the 
Commission was too severe. There may be others who seek to use this 
action to suggest that nuclear power is inherently unsafe. The Commis-
sion believes strongly that neither is a proper conclusion. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1954). 
58 42 U.S.C. § § 2012-2239 (1957). 
57 42 U.S.C. § 2011 et seq. (1954). In this revision, Congress de-
clared that the development, use, and control of atomic energy shall 
be directed so as to make the maximum contribution to the general 
welfare, and also provided for several programs, including those for 
conducting, assisting, and fostering research and development in 
order to encourage maximum scientific and industrial progress; and 
to encourage widespread participation in the development and utili-
zation of atomic energy for peaceful purposes to the maximum ex-
tent consistent with the common defense and security, and with the 
health and safety of the public. 
58 42 U.S.C. §§ 2012-2239 (1957). 
59 42 U.S.C. § 2210 (1966). 
80 H.R. 15323, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
81 See, Veto of Atomic Energy Amendments, President's Mes-
sage to the House of Representatives (Oct. 12, 1974), 10 WEEKLY 
COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 1279 (1974). 
82 In the June 1975 issue of Not Man Apart, Friends of the Earth 
devoted a full page to questions and answers about nuclear insur-
ance which it opened with the question: "If nuclear powerplants are 
as safe as industry claims, then why aren't they fully insured?" It 
then went on to estimate that a major nuclear accident could cause 
casualties of up to 45,000 people with 100,000 more injured and 
property damage of more than $17 billion. 
On June 4, 1974, Senator Gravel wrote to all Members of Congress 
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opposing extension of the Price-Anderson Act and proposed instead 
a bill to make nuclear utilities take financial responsibility for what 
they do, like other businesses. "Only if nuclear power is safe enough 
for utility stockholders can the American people believe it is safe 
enough for themselves." 
63 The interested reader will find a detailed presentation of argu-
ments for extension of the Price-Anderson Act in HEARINGS ON THE 
POSSIBLE MODIFICATION OR EXTENSION OF THE PRICE-ANDERSON INSUR-
ANCE AND INDEMNITY ACT BEFORE THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON ATOMIC 
ENERGY, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., pts. 1 & 2 (1974). 
64 A report of the Congressional Research Service estimated that 
Federal expenditures relating to nuclear power for fiscal years 1948 
through 1974 totaled some $13.6 billion. This consisted of $4.5 bil-
lion for military and space applications, $3.7 billion for civil power, 
$3.9 billion in related physical research and about $1.5 billion for 
related biological, medical and environmental research. W. H. DON-
NELLY, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FEDERAL EXPENDITURES 
RELATING TO CIVIL NUCLEAR POWER, FISCAL YEARS 1948-1974 (1973). 
65 EXPLORING ENERGY CHOICES: A PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE 
FORD FOUNDATION'S ENERGY POllCY PROJECT 75 (1974). The other 
energy technologies included in the analysis were coal resource de-
velopment, petroleum and natural gas, nuclear fusion, energy con-
version, general energy research and development, conservation in-
cluding transportation, solar energy and geothermal energy. 
66 The Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, Pub. L. 93-438 (Oct. 
11, 1974). 
67 Energy and Natural Resources, Statement by the President 
(June 29, 1973), 9 WEEKLY COMPILATION OF PRESIDENTIAL DOCUMENTS 
870 (1973). 
68 121 CONGo REC. 520-522 (daily ed., Feb. 4, 1975) (remarks of 
Congressman Vanik). 
69 [d. at 521. The Vanik analysis shows the principal non-nuclear 
subjects for energy research during fiscal year 1976 as: coal at $279 
million, representing 6.5 percent of the ERDA budget; petroleum 
and natural gas at $23 million, representing 0.6 percent; oil shale 
at $8 million, representing 0.2 percent; and solar energy at $57 mil-
lion, representing 1.5 percent. In comparison, he estimated nuclear 
energy development at $563 million, representing 15 percent. 
70 42 U.S.C. §§ 5551-56 (1974). 
71 30 U.S.C. §§ 1101-64 (1974). 
72 42 U.S.C. §§ 5501-17 (1974). 
73 Pub. L. 93-577 (Dec. 31, 1974). 
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74 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-4 (1974). 
75 Supra note 68, at 521. 
78 H. R. 13716, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974). 
77 H. R. 4971, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
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78 In 1973 the management-consulting firm, Arthur D. Little 
(ADL), delivered a report to the Board of Trustees of Northeast 
Utilities on base-load alternatives for the northeast utilities system. 
In that report ADL, after considering all alternatives for the region, 
concluded that nuclear power is the appropriate choice for the base-
load additions contemplated by the utilities for start of service in 
the period 1981-1984 and so recommended. 
79 H. R. 5406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975). 
80 The term "nuclear fuel cycle" refers to the chain of industrial 
operations necessary for nuclear power. The cycle starts with the 
mining of uranium and proceeds through milling, chemical process-
ing, enriching, fuel fabrication, fuel use, fuel reprocessing, waste 
disposal, and, of course, the transportation of nuclear materials and 
wastes between these various operations. 
81 Some scientists are now looking into the ideas of separating out 
the most bothersome radioactive species from the nuclear wastes 
and either storing these separately, which would reduce the storage 
problem, or using the energy emitted from them for industrial, med-
ical and other purposes. As for the heavy metal components of the 
wastes, the so-called transuranic elements, some scientists would 
transmute these into short-lived isotopes by exposure to neutrons. 
While these ideas are in their preliminary stage, they illustrate some 
of the innovation in thought that can be expected as solutions are 
sought to problems of nuclear power. However, we must be sure that 
the solutions do not in turn generate new and worse problems. For 
example, if radioactive strontium and cesium were to be removed 
from nuclear wastes and widely used in industry, would the risk of 
occupational and public exposure from this solution exceed the risks 
of exposure from burial of the wastes in salt mines? 
82 H. R. 5406, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) is intended to accom-
plish this result. The author welcomes this opportunity to invite 
comment and support from the readers of Environmental Affairs. 
